



# **Communicative Planning Theory**

**Progress  
since Habermas**

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# Preface

This monograph is devoted to discussing the body of literature about Communicative Planning Theory (CPT) to highlight its key lenses in which a researcher can employ them in solving relevant research problems. In the body of literature, Communicative Planning also has been referred to in other terms such as *collaborative planning* or *collaborative governance*, *argumentative planning*, “*planning through debate*”, “*inclusionary discourse*”, and “*deliberative planning*”. Communicative Planning Theory has penetrated different interconnected research areas solving social problems in health, energy, environmental policy, poverty, disaster management, gender studies and so on.

The monograph first introduces the initial academic study on communicative planning, i.e. the Habermasian ideal of *communicative action*, otherwise known as *communicative rationality*. Secondly, it reflects on the critical refinements to the Habermasian views. Finally, the chapter reviews the growing contemporary theoretical scholarship on Communicative Planning Theory in a way it is helpful for researchers to grasp its different lenses.

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# Chapter one

## Habermasian Communicative Rationality

### The Habermasian Ideal of Communicative Planning

The contemporary landscape of Communicative Planning Theory is accepted to be originated with the scholarship of philosopher Jürgen Habermas with his writing in 1981 on the theory of communicative action (Harris, 2002; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000, cited in Purcell, 2009; Healey, 2006). It is also known as the critical project of Habermas because it emerged from his discussion on *critical theory* (see, for example, Thompson and Held, 1982) or *ideal speech situations* (see, for example, Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Healey, 1999). With the reintroduction of intellectual lenses such as questions of how can knowledge and power be dealt with in planning, it has occupied an extremely hegemonic position in planning theory since modernism (Gunder, 2010; Purcell, 2009).

As stated by Healey (1997: 44), Habermas (1984, 1981, 1979) questions,

*“How communicative rationality can reconcile the individuation of cultural identity with a recognition of commonality between individuals of different frames of reference, and interests, in ways which do not trap us in modes of thought and practices which suppress our individual capacity to flourish?”*

To achieve this Habermas suggested that planning should consider all types of reasoning that may include:

- (i) Instrumental or technical reasoning – scientific, processed, rationalistic, superiority or epistemic reasoning
- (ii) Moral reasoning – reasons focused on values and ethics
- (iii) Emotive-aesthetic reasoning – reasons focused on emotive experience.

Habermas argued that planning should not give more privilege to rational reasoning, i.e., scientific knowledge; planning decisions should also incorporate other reasoning such as moral and emotive (knowledge). On that basis, Habermas challenged the superiority held by the scientific knowledge granted by the rational planning model (Khakee, Barbanente and Borri, 2000: 776). It rest on the idea that all knowledge is “situated” thus actors held them provisionally at a given time. Instrumental reasoning only provides part of the basis for good judgement and sound decision-making (ibid). Habermas argued that the role of planners should emphasise listening to peoples’ stories and assisting in forging a consensus among different stakeholder viewpoints (Fainstein, 2000).

In this communicative process, Habermas prescribed the norms for the ideal speech situation for communicative action to be undistorted and defined by openness and a lack of oppression (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Language has been given a prominent place (Habermas, 1984: 86). Thus, his readings on communicative rationality primarily focused on two aspects: the clarification of what communicative action (speech acts) are and the power of speech situations. Based on the theory put forward by Habermas, communicative actions should be separated from strategic actions. Strategic actions are intended to achieve the success of the participating stakeholder; they look at the effectiveness of the action in attaining the end result and thus are addressed to the objective world (Habermas, 1984). Communicative actions, on the other hand, are weighted towards reaching an understanding of a situation and the plans of action in order to coordinate their plans by way of agreement or consensus among stakeholders (ibid). In this process, Habermas identified “power” as a distortion factor for communicative actions. As a consequence, his advocacy was that speech situations (i.e. institutional design for communicative action as discussed later in this monograph) aiming at consensus-building should be “power neutral” (Forester, 2001, 1999b, 1989b; Throgmorton, 1996, cited in Tiesdell and Adams, 2004).

Despite the variety in normative beliefs on CPT, communicative planning theorists namely John Forester, Patsy Healey, Charles Hoch, Judith Innes and their followers, agreed with Habermas in many respects and stated that communicative planning is an enterprise for planning democracy, promoting social justice and environmental sustainability. They asserted that by presenting such an ideal, Habermas would not have expected such communication to be easy – or even likely to be easy – but that it could aid progress towards the ideal (Purcell, 2009). However, the concept advanced by Habermas has come to be seen as representing a “*communicative ideal*” since it assumes universal pragmatics (Thompson and Held, 1982) and does not mirror practice (Innes, 2004). As a result, the theory delves into questions of practice that raised several critical refinements.

### **Critical refinements to the Habermasian Ideal**

The critical refinement to the work of Habermas can be ascribed to three basic arguments. Firstly, a critical mark was applied to his advocacy on the neutrality of power within communicative planning actions of stakeholders. Based on Foucault conception of power that it is universal (see, for example, Foucault, 1991, 1984, 1983, 1980) the later Communicative Planning Theory writers such as Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002, 1998); Fischler (2000); Hillier (2000); Huxley (2000); Huxley and Yiftachel (2000), cited in Purcell (2009); Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones (2000); and Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) argued that Habermas view on Communicative Planning Theory has given insufficient attention to the practical context of power relations of economic actors in which planning practice is situated; thereby, it is abstract and pays too little attention to

politics and the power-laden interests of different stakeholders in the planning process (McGuirk, 2001). In that light, they constructed the argument that Habermas' "power" stance on Communicative Planning Theory is a lofty ideal of consensus-building free of constraints (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 1998).

Secondly, in connection to the critique on power, scholars such as Gunder (2010); Purcell (2009); Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998), often questioned whether communicative planning was sufficiently supportive of disempowered citizens amid neo-liberalism and questioned whether it unwittingly supported unfettered markets. For example, Purcell (2009: 158) stated that "*communicative theorists want us to believe that if one follows the precepts of speech situations, they would be freed from an unsatisfying contest for scarce resources – from antagonism, struggle, and 'politics' – and can forge a new society in which everyone can achieve their goals, but it may not be well suited to confront neo-liberalisation*". To support this critical view, the scholars drew on two traits of the ideas advanced by Habermas: demonising instrumental rationality and the fact that Communicative Planning Theory has moved from the concept of citizen participation to stakeholder participation (multiple interests). They argued that emphasising subjective reasoning and the expansion of the pool of participants allow large consolidated corporations to stand within the planning process and manipulate the planning agenda of local environments for their success (Purcell, 2009: 141). In this way, communicative planning can become its own tyranny, paving the path to support neo-liberalisation rather than to address social and environmental costs in planning local environments (see, for example, Bengs, 2005; Purcell, 2009: 141; Huxley, 2000).

Thirdly, concern was raised with respect to the lack of clarity on consensus building under Communicative Planning Theory. Some argued that this consensus representing nothing more than compromise and lowest common denominator solutions, often reached through peer pressure (Hillier, 2003), may carry the risk of members in a planning group opting out of agreements at any time (Innes, 2004: 12) and that too little consideration was paid to the right of appeal (through courts or appeal mechanisms) to a reached consensus to solve unresolved disputes (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998).

These critical refinements altogether identified several areas in which the Habermas reading of Communicative Planning Theory lacked specificity and nuance. Those have been teasing out to shape the contemporary Communicative Planning Theory subsequently into multiple disciplines of deeper interests.

### **Subsequent Theoretical Proponents for Communicative Planning**

The new theorists generally sought pragmatism on Communicative Planning Theory (Fischler, 2000). They attempted to address the unclarified and sceptical normative questions of Communicative Planning Theory by studying different spatial and local environmental planning practices, including the policy-making and development of



housing etc. The following chapters, therefore, discusses the multiple disciplines in which Communicative Planning Theory was shaped into: power, the ontology of communicative action, institutional design, knowledge and consensus-building.

# Chapter Two


## The Influence of Power

The discussion on “power neutralisation” is central to Communicative Planning Theory. This is owing to the Habermasian stance that power should be neutral in the exercise of communicative actions, and the fact that it embraced the concept of stakeholders over citizens who could oppress the power of the latter. Institutions that generate knowledge for planning will not necessarily ensure neutrality (Irwin, 1995) and power takes effect through the ability to define what is accepted or validated as knowledge (McGuirk, 2001). Therefore, it raised questions about how power is perceived and how it can be neutralised in the praxis of contemporary Communicative Planning Theory.

Lukes’ (1986) three dimensions of power provides an understanding of “power” in a generic sense. In the first dimension, power was seen as a causal relationship between the behaviour of two agents (also known as decision-making power), i.e. A's behaviour regularly causes B to do something that B does not want to do. In the second dimension, power was perceived to be generated as a result of a decision that suppresses or thwarts a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of a decision (i.e., non-decision-making power). According to Lukes, in this sense, power cannot be possessed but can only be exercised. Consequently, borrowing Schattschneider's concept, this dimension generated the idea of power as the mobilisation of bias (Bradshaw, 1976). In the third dimension, Lukes viewed the exercise of power through the lens of objective interest or agenda-setting – what an agent would do under ideal democratic circumstances – i.e., if A affects B in a manner which limits what B would do under ideal conditions, then it can be properly said that A exercises power over B (manipulating the view of others). As a whole, Lukes’ definition explained power as a dependent variable of the structure. Extending from Lukes’ premise, Giddens (1979) saw the power in a relational sense between both agency and structure. Instead of three dimensions, Giddens condensed the classification into two dimensions, i.e., the actions of agents carry power in the form of transformative capacity in the effort of setting others to comply with their wants, whilst the structures of domination employ asymmetry of resources in order to sustain the power relations in and between the systems of interactions (Giddens, 1984, 1979) (*Figure 1*).

Following Giddens, Purdy (2012); Hardy and Phillips (1998) recognised that power depends on authority, resource (allocative) and discursive legitimacy. Authoritative power concerns the socially acknowledged right to make judgements, decisions or take actions (Greenwald, 2008). Resource-based power deals with the dependencies between organisations involved in collaboration and their ability to organise resources (Purdy, 2012). This resource power includes tangible resources such as financial resources,

people, and technology; and intangible resources such as knowledge, culture, and capabilities. Discursive legitimacy, on the other hand, is a form of power that refers to the ability of an organisation to be represented in discourse or speak on an issue in the public sphere (Hardy and Phillips, 1998), for example, the power enabling a particular community organisation to speak in a public consultation on behalf of the respective community. Similarly, Giddens' explanation of transformative capacity in an alternative sense developed into two concepts: "power over" and "power to" (Healey, 2007; Njoh, 2007; Giddens, 1984). The authority that individuals, bodies or organisations retain to perform specific duties constitutes "power over" whilst the "power to" covers the resource base of organisations (human resources, finances, and equipment).



**Figure 1** Giddens' explanation on power

Source: Giddens (1979: 100)

In response to the critics for Habermas' stance on power in communicative rationality (Chapter 1) the contemporary communicative planning writers have suggested proponents in dealing with power. For instance, Albrechts (2003: 916) offered a framework that can recognise power by way of analysing different rationalities of planning that affect different stages of planning. Those rationalities are:

- Communitive rationality- recognise and accept a platform for actors to discuss shared problems and reflect on ways out of these problems.
- Value rationality - a design of shared futures; to develop and promote common assets
- Instrumental rationality - to encourage accountability within a time and budgetary framework
- Strategic rationality - to create an awareness of the systems of power, to construct some initial alliances to arm oneself against the prevailing power structure

Albrechts argued that such identification opens up the avenues to recognise the way planning can deal with power. Building on Albrechts, Brownill and Carpenter (2007) stated, not only the identification of these rationalities but also the recognition of tensions between them are important to inform the power deal in communicative planning. Communicative action will always be political and carries power and power-driven “distortion” is a drive for intelligible communication (Brownill and Carpenter, 2007; Hiller, 2003; Mouffe, 2000, 1999). Planning should create an awareness of the systems of power to construct required alliances to counter the prevailing power structures (Albrechts, 2003). In that respect, power can be seen as a modality of change (Martens, 2001) rather than seeing it through the lens of negativity (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002). As indicated in Chapter 1, this stance of power in communicative planning was underpinned by Foucault’s perspective, that power is everywhere and cannot be contained. The proponents argued that mobilise power as a modality of change gets further reinforced with the Giddens’ conceptualisation of power. The action of agents has the transformative capacity and power has a duality of structure – agents are not isolated or autonomous all the time-thus all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of those who are in a superior position. In that sense, actions such as communicative planning can empower the community to change or shape their housing outcome (structures). This proponent in practice becomes a point of intersection with the “community participation” stream of literature which was first encapsulated with Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) “ladder of citizen participation”. The rationality that promotes here is, citizens should be treated as stakeholders having decision-making powers about their environments. Therefore, what this intersection implies is that communicative planning should operate in a world of shared power, where planning policy processes take place in a context where all stakeholders should have a fair distribution of power (Bryson and Crosby, 2006). In other words, power neutralisation of actors by means of power-sharing. In practice, it is for the local communities (in other words residents in the case of housing delivery) that power needs to be shared to increase their participation, in parallel with the corporations that have more power because they are large and have more resources. The recognition here is that whilst all stakeholders in local spatial planning should be engaged in the communicative planning process, local communities are of primary importance as a source of emotive or experiential knowledge, and are the owners of the planning problem. Nevertheless, they often lack power (authoritative, allocative or discursive legitimacy) and require an appropriate structure empowering them to participate.

**Table 1 - Ladders of community participation**

Traditional ladders pyramidal power		Ladders of the nineties strong ideological vision			Contemporary ladders		Level of empow erment
Arnstein (1969)	Connor (1988) cited in in Conroy	Widemann & Femers (1993)	Wilcox (1994) cited in Garau (2012)	Dorcey, Doney & Rueggeberg (1994) cited in Garau (2012)	Ecosfera (2001)	Gangemi (2010) cited in Garau (2012)	
<b>The degree of citizen power</b>	<b>Leaders</b>	Public participation in the final decision	Supporting local initiatives of supporting independent community interests	Ongoing involvement	Self-production Self-management	A civil society that participates formality and substantively	
Citizen control	Resolution			Seek consensus	Collaboration - Active involvement		
Delegated power	Litigation	Public participation in assessing risks and recommending solutions	Acting together	Task ideas, see ideas	Consultation	A civil society that acts	
Partnership	Mediation			Consult on reaction			
<b>Degrees of Tokenism</b>	Joint planning	Public participation in defining interests and actors and determining agendas	Deciding together	Define issues	Information-communication	A civil society that informs	
Placation	<b>General Public</b>			Gather information, perspectives		A civil society which anticipates but not substantively	
Consultation	Consultation	Public right to object	Consultation	Educate	Non-participation	Civil society "live"	
Informing							
<b>Non Participation</b>	Information feedback	Informing the public	Information	Inform			
Therapy	Education	Public right to know					
Manipulation							

Source: Adapted from Garau (2012)

For example, *Table 1* has streamlined some community participatory models proposed by different studies – structures to empower communities. Each step of the participation depicted in the table corresponds to the degree of involvement of the citizens. Even though all these models are subject to various strengths and weaknesses in terms of describing a community or public participation, this monograph is not a point of convergence for such a discussion. But as indicated in *Table 1*, if power was to be used as a change agent (i.e. power in the form of transformative capacity), it needs the highest degree of local community participation.

Another angle that supports this argument is to appreciate that agents in a postmodern world (or ‘informational age’; Innes, 1998) are networked and that networked power improves the availability of choices to solve problems. This view is primarily included in the works of Booher and Innes (2010, 2002) and Innes (2004). Through communicative planning, participants build relationships, mutual understanding and shared heuristics and understanding of the system (Booher and Innes, 2002). These networks, in turn, mean that they collectively have the power to influence change or produce their desired outcomes. Here the argument is that consensus building and collaborative dialogue also can create a new form of power – network power – from which actors or stakeholders could benefit by improving the choices available as a result of collectively developed innovative ideas (Innes and Booher, 1999).

Therefore, what the contemporary understanding suggests is that communicative action need not avoid power but accept and handle power to the benefit of the planning purpose – mobilise power to create a network and benefit from those networks to generate new ideas and empower the communities to own both problems and solutions.

# Chapter Three

## Ontology of Communicative Action

With the early Habermasian view that communicative action should be separated from strategic actions, another argument raised within the contemporary Communicative Planning Theory was “what is” and “what is not” considered as communicative action. Some studies clarified this, considering the ontological aspects (nature of being) of communicative action. The concern of those studies was to investigate on what basis the speech acts can be legitimised as communicative actions.

The contemporary Communicative Planning Theory claims that the “self-interest” aiming for self-gain (success) is the main driver of stakeholders’ to engage in the consensus-building process. In other words, communicative action cannot be separated from strategic intent. In this respect, Innes’ work has become more influential in the field (see, for example, Innes, 2004; Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2000). Based on rational choice arguments – agents mean to achieve maximised output for a given input or minimised input for a given output to achieve her or his ends (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock, 1967; Olson, 1965; Arrow, 1963; Riker, 1962; Downs, 1957 all of whom are cited in Booher and Innes (2002), Booher and Innes (2002) argued that each stakeholder as a player at the table wants something from one or more of the others. The stakeholders give up nothing they have outside the process unless it benefits them (Innes, 2004). Booher and Innes (2002) further argue that even if some stakeholders are not entirely happy (have lost) in terms of what the consensus-building process produces, they may decide not to oppose it as they have made all the effort they could and have got some of the wins they wanted. Thus, the debate is, without acknowledging and allowing stakeholders to open up their self-interest (interdependencies) an authentic dialogue and opportunities for reciprocity will be missed, important information about the problem will not be surfaced, and creative solutions are far less likely to emerge (Booher and Innes, 2002).

Innes from a different viewpoint highlighted the contradiction of Habermasian claim; rejection of strategic intent within communicative planning actionstud whilst at the same time expecting the “truthfulness”, to validate it.

*“Stakeholders very rarely participate in collaborative efforts because they are selfless altruists or because they are searching for the common good. Participants become involved because they have learned their interests are interdependent in some way on the actions of others. Otherwise, they would pursue their interests outside the collaborative process. They hope to achieve something together that they cannot achieve alone” (Innes, 2002: 7).*

This proposition was also grounded by Ansell and Gash (2008) by conducting a systematic review of several studies of collaborative governance (communicative planning) across a range of policy sectors including housing. Based on many studies (Warner, 2006; Roussos and Fawcett, 2000; Weech-Maldonado and Merrill, 2000; Chrislip and Larson, 1994 all of whom are cited in Ansell and Gash, 2008), they agreed that incentives to participate or intermediate outcomes (or otherwise known as small wins or interdependencies) are essential success factors for the effective communicative planning process.

However, this admission further sets the ground for scepticism about communicative planning: accepting that planning decision-making is about the respect of the self-interest of stakeholders can create an entirely safe scenario for neo-liberalism to succeed. For instance, counter arguing on Innes' proposition, Purcell (2009: 11) stated that the acceptance of the self-interest concept guarantees that the hegemonic position of capital cannot be significantly challenged, where the business groups need the buy-in of 'disadvantaged and minority stakeholders' to legitimate their decisions. Yet, on the contrary, some scholars make use of this proposition to respect the self-interest of stakeholders and to reject the term NIMBYism (not-in-my-back-yard) used conventionally to describe local opposition to new development projects like housing, or in other words, politicising participants as good or bad participants (see for example McClymont and O'hare, 2008; Burningham, 2000). Generally, housing studies on NIMBYism were underpinned by the approaches that evaluated the local opposition for new residential development primarily in the light of a neoclassical understanding of housing number delivery in rural areas (for example, Matthews, Bramley and Hastings, 2015; Scally and Tighe, 2015; McClymont and O'hare, 2008), i.e. any local opposition that hampers the new housing output is generally labelled as NIMBYs or selfish participants. But the proposition of legitimising the self-interests of stakeholders, based on the fact that communicative planning is about dealing with different interests, calls for an open-minded and depoliticised approach to view this local civic engagement in communicative planning.




# Chapter Four

## Institutional Design

Given the emphasis that Communicative Planning Theory is about harnessing all knowledge types and power to be shared in the process, another inquiry that emerged was the mechanism to facilitate such expectations: the institutional design or what Habermas (1984) identified as the *speech situation*. This aspect, therefore, explores the structural or institutional capacities of conducting communicative planning. According to Ansell and Gash (2008: 555), the institutional design refers to the basic protocols and ground rules for communicative actions, which are critical for the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process. Either to progress towards the Habermasian ideal or to reinforce and find ways to modify the ideal, many theorists saw that corresponding institutional design in practice is the ultimate structure that determines the outcomes of communicative planning. “*The collaborative approach to strategic place-making is unlikely to flourish without some changes in political culture and institutional design*” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998: 19). This means that the theory adopts Giddens’ conceptualisation which recognises power as being carried in the policy discourses, institutional practices, structural forms, cultural systems, and social relations which contextualise planning practice (McGuirk, 2001: 3). On this basis, different protocols or institutional audits (Healey, 1996: 22–23) for communicative actions were suggested in the literature, outlining good practices that minimise these (systematic) distortions to let reasoning dominate the deliberate power (Martens, 2001).

Among several good practices, the most fundamental institutional design issue of all has been who should participate in the communicative planning process (Ansell and Gash, 2008). It is more commonly agreed that communicative planning should be inclusive of all stakeholders who are affected by or care about the issue, including potential ‘troublesome’ stakeholders (Chrislip and Larson, 1994, cited in Ansell and Gash, 2008). Here the rationale was that participants should try to achieve that intersubjective understanding which is the crude level of expectation of communicative planning (Purcell, 2009; Day and Gunton, 2003; Lasker and Weiss, 2003; Healey, 2006; Chrislip and Larson, cited in Ansell and Gash, 2008 1994; Gray, 1989). Similarly, the features accepted as “authentic dialogue” included that the setting of the institutional design of the negotiation table should be face-to-face (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Booher and Innes, 2002; Bentrup, 2001; Healey, 2006; Habermas, 1984), encourage both formal and informal interaction and accept that negotiation is a time-consuming process and thus the process should not be limited to deadlines (Innes, 2004; Healey, 2006). The scholars advocated that in this way it helps to break down the stereotypes and the power of actors in the negotiation process can be largely equalised. Portman (2009) and Habermas (1984) also insisted that knowledge within communicative actions should flow as a two-way process:

while stakeholders are consulted, the process should make information available to all political communities for critical review. Several authors identified this requirement under different labels. For example, giving “accountability” to the process (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006; Healey, 2006: 289), “transparency” of the design (Imperial, 2005; Day and Gunton, 2003; Tett, Crowther and O’Hara, 2003; Alexander, Comfort and Weiner, 1998) and “instrumental rationality” (Albrechts, 2003). These studies argue that there is a direct positive correlation between governance in institutional design and the trust-building and mutual-respect aspect among stakeholders in the communicative planning process. The “leadership” factor is also important to guide the process through difficult patches and make the stakeholders engage in the process with good faith and explore opportunities (Bryson and Crosby, 2006; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005; Imperial, 2005; Murdock, Wiessner and Sexton 2005; Frame, Gunton and Day, 2004; Day and Gunton, 2003; Gilliam et al., 2002; Chrislip and Larson, 1994, cited in Ansell and Gash, 2008). According to Innes (2004: 7), the process and institutional setting for communicative planning should have been designed and organised by the participants themselves – setting the ground rules for behaviour, agenda-setting, making decisions and many other topics. As a whole, the idea was that the institutional design should be set up to make the stakeholders feel comfortable and safe in expressing their honest (truthful) views and feelings so that it enables generating deep knowledge outcomes within the communicative planning process (Innes and Booher, 2000).



**Figure 2** Variables to evaluate the institutional design for the communicative planning process

Source: Author

In this procedural legitimacy, the theory has also cast the normative roles for both planner and planning (see also Sec 2.4.4, Chapter 2). The planner should be a “critical friend” (Forester, 1989a; Healey, 2006; Innes, 1995) whose primary tasks are to deal with “misinformation”, the source of communicative distortion (McGuirk, 2001), knowledge mediators and brokers, drawing on expert understanding of the procedures, politics, institutions and norms of governance (Healey, 1992b) and to assemble the necessary resources and enable a policy dialogue to develop (Throgmorton, 1996, cited in Tiesdell and Adams, 2004). The observations of the above theorists are that everyday planners exercise power through their communications with different stakeholders and these communications are empowering or disempowering the listener, depending on how they conduct their communicative actions (Forester, 1989b). These institutional design principles altogether set the normative framework to evaluate a particular structured practice of communicative planning (*Figure 2*) in the light of its effectiveness in achieving a certain planning notion likewise.

# Chapter Five

## Knowledge

For Communicative Planning Theory, having the hegemony in modernist and postmodernist planning philosophy, the harnessing of varying knowledge types is of central relevance for planning to make a positive change (Rydin, 2007). This makes the relationship between planning and knowledge even more explicit. For instance, planning was defined as a link between knowledge and action (Friedmann 1987: 38–44) or a unit of intelligence (Khakee, Barbanente and Borri, 2000). However, one of the refinements highlighted in the early Communicative Planning Theory literature was that it lacks specificity as to how varying sources of knowledge are to be dealt with in plan decision-making. Whilst Habermas recognised the validity aspects of different speech acts, his scholarship was insufficient to clarify the normative principles as to how to play with the varied knowledge obtained within the planning process for decision-making. This chapter, therefore, reflects on the contemporary Communicative Planning Theory on knowledge formation within plan decision-making.

First, it is important to clarify what is considered to be knowledge. Communicative planning theory recognises that knowledge is constructed through social processes, where scientific knowledge provides only a part of the basis for good judgement and sound decision-making (Khakee, Barbanente and Borri, 2000: 776; Habermas, 1984). In Foucauldian terms, knowledge is a discourse built through particular systems of rationality (McGuirk, 2001). It is also an entity, to be held and used (Rydin, 2007). Innes (1998) emphasised that “knowledge” from stakeholders (or *information*) can turn the ‘same old’ planning into a different unit that gives it a different capacity to make decisions for us – generate synergetic capacities to mark innovative solutions.

The contemporary Communicative planning theory, recasting Habermasian theory, attempts to specify more, including how lay knowledge in local policy practice can be applied to planning decision-making. Among such discourse, this review has recognised two studies: Rydin (2007) and Khakee, Barbanente and Borri, (2000).

Khakee, Barbanente and Borri (2000) provided a framework of variables to evaluate (validate) both expert and experiential (lay) knowledge in a communicative planning process. As shown in **Table 2**, those variables include *realism*, *relevance*, *commitment*, *the level of concretion* (i.e. *how substantive is the knowledge? To what extent can it be operationalised?*: *ibid*: 787) and *use of knowledge*. By employing two case studies in which communicative actions were exercised (the Horby plan for housing development (Sweden) and the regeneration of the historical centre and harbour district (Molfetta, Italy), the study demonstrated how the said variables had been used to validate (evaluate) the knowledge inputs. For instance, in the evaluation on the *realism* of knowledge, the

study highlighted that in the regeneration project (Molfetta, Italy), the experiential knowledge of the public had been related to knowledge about real-life but was often of short-term orientation towards the future planning outcome. The expert knowledge, on the other hand, had spoken about specific town problems but did not consider relevant cultural and organisational obstacles that hampered implementation. The study suggests that the application of these variables within a validation scheme, enables the identification of strengths and weaknesses of knowledge inputs, would guide the application of knowledge types to make planning decisions more effective.

Rydin's (2007) study on communicative planning worked on the classification of knowledge: current state, predicted state, societal processes, planning process, outcome state, planning societal interactions and normative (**Table 3**), arguing that this typology would guide the planners on how to apply them appropriately for planning decision-making. The study explained how each knowledge typology linked to the different state of planning of local environments (See **Table 3** and **Figure 3**). For instance, if knowledge is classified under "*societal process knowledge*" that can inform the planning of a particular local environment from Current State A to Predicted State B<sup>1</sup>. In other words, according to the example in **Table 3**, the "*societal process knowledge*" like: "Understanding the dynamics of the house building industry, the housing market and the allocation of housing to social groups", is more appropriate to plan ways in which to meet the housing shortage in respective areas (**Figure 3**). This framework, therefore, informs knowledge handling (how, why and when to use the expert or lay knowledge), or how planners should apply knowledge to the relevant decision-making.

This framework accordingly can be applied to inform the mechanisms in which the knowledge gained from public engagement exercises can be validated. What was notable in both studies above was that despite guidelines provided concerning variables and knowledge typologies, it still requires subjective (researchers' or planners') judgements as to how the analysis of knowledge will be carried out. At the same time, whilst knowledge is central to the Communicative Planning Theory discourse, in the body of literature, the knowledge application to plan decision making is still at its' early stages of discussion. Therefore, as yet, attention has not been directed to investigate the time-space effect on the knowledge inputs of stakeholders. For instance, new large-scale housing delivery in practice would have different phases of development delivery, where the stake of the existing local residents who might participate at the initial stage would be different to the new resident who might settle at a later phase of development delivery. This is particularly relevant in connection with the argument that all communicative planning processes and respective outcomes would not be held as a one-off event but will be a social learning process during which different stakeholders would participate. Reflection on these dynamics of stakeholders and their knowledge inputs is possible, only if the empirical testing considers the time-space effect on Communicative Planning Theory.

**Table 2** Variables to validate expert and experimental knowledge


<b>Evaluation variable</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Realism</b>	Does the knowledge express real life, facts, etc. in a true way? Does it omit anything objectionable or painful? Does it idealise issues?
<b>Relevance</b>	Is the knowledge related to what is being discussed? Does it supply facts concerning the issues at hand? Is the knowledge pertinent?
<b>Commitment</b>	Per definition, experts do not have the same obligation as do the participants from the various community interests to pay attention to the knowledge-action link. The community participants bind themselves either explicitly or implicitly to what they state during the communicative exercises. This dimension is, nevertheless, relevant because it shows the level of engagement in the issues under consideration.
<b>Level of concretion</b>	What is the level of abstraction in the knowledge? How substantive is the knowledge? To what extent can it be operationalised?
<b>Use of knowledge</b>	How do those responsible for preparing the development plan react to the expert and experiential knowledge? How do they go about using them? Does their professional status affect their reception of the two types of knowledge?

**Source:** Khakee, Barbanente and Borri (2000)

**Table 3** Classification of knowledge types and relevance to a particular planning outcome

<b>Knowledge typology</b>	<b>Broad typology</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Link to Figure 1</b>	<b>Ex 1: Promoting sustainable construction</b>	<b>Ex 2: Responding to the housing market</b>
Current state	Experiential /empirical	Empirical account of current socio-economic and environmental situation	State A	Current construction technology and associated environmental impacts	Indicators of housing supply and demand including price, homelessness, population, etc.
Predicted state	Predictive	Prediction of a future scenario under trend conditions	State B <sup>1</sup>	Trends in technology and industry take up and predicted environmental impacts	Trends in demographics, housebuilding, prices etc., including local scenarios
Societal processes	Process	Process understanding of social-economic and environmental processes affecting society	Linking A and B <sup>1</sup>	Understanding R & D processes in construction and pressures towards sustainable development in the industry	Understanding the dynamics of the housebuilding industry, the housing market and the allocation of housing to social groups
Planning process	Process	Process understanding of planning	Linking A and B <sup>2</sup>	Role of planning in agenda-setting: how sustainable R and D can be embedded in planning decision-making	The influence of housing market indicators and other factors in planning decision-making on releasing housing land
Outcome state	Experimental/empirical	Empirical account of outcomes of planning processes in specific societal contexts	State B <sup>3</sup>	Monitoring of changes in construction technology	Monitoring housing market indicators in the locality
Planning societal interactions	Process	Process understanding of how planning and societal processes interacted to create outcomes	Linking A and B <sup>3</sup>	Understanding of how planning influences construction patterns	Understanding of how planning releases housing land and the impact on prices and meeting housing need in the locality
Normative knowledge	Normative	Understanding of desired goals for planning	State B <sup>2</sup>	The vision of potential sustainable construction developments	The vision of how housing need should be met

Source: Adapted from Rydin (2007)



**Figure 3** Knowledge relevance for the planning process

Source: Adapted from Rydin (2007)



# Chapter Six

## Consensus-Building

Consensus building refers to the decision-making aspect of the communicative planning process. Therefore, this chapter investigates what propositions the consensus-building theory, in particular, has offered to develop the understanding of Communicative Planning Theory. Concerning communicative planning, consensus-building refers to the degree to which stakeholders are willing to commit to a proposal, where a proposal refers to a course of action for attaining the group's declared goals (Briggs, Kolfshoten and Vreede, 2005: 2). To explain the same idea, Healey (2006) employed the term "strategy making". This concept brings along more closely related terms that included "conflict" and "decision-making". Briggs, Kolfshoten and Vreede's study (2005: 3) attempted to recognise the subtle difference between these. For them, a *conflict* means a state where one or more stakeholders are unwilling to commit (reciprocity of ideas) to a proposal to which other stakeholders are willing to commit and a *decision* is an act when stakeholders commit to a proposal. Thus, relating to the discussion of this chapter, consensus-building (or strategy making as an alternative term) is the process that mobilises reciprocities of frames of references and arenas that stakeholders have acquired, encouraged participants to probe on different meanings (Healey, 2006) and determined the level of commitment towards a particular planning outcome. Therefore, as explained by Innes et al. (1994) this is the stage where discussing and validating knowledge, power-sharing, negotiating and confronting experts with lay participants, assessing findings, creating new ideas and implications of each frame of references would come into consideration.

Some writers on consensus-building focused on what constitutes "meaningful" consensus. More generically a plan that considers all interests are met and has fully explored options and consequences of an action are likely to be having a "meaningful" consensus in terms of being *innovative, just* and *sustainable* (Innes and Booher, 1999). The other normative proponents they claim as traits for "meaningful" consensus are (ibid:420)

- (i) producing a high-quality agreement
- (ii) an end statement
- (iii) compares favourably with other planning methods in terms of costs and benefits
- (iv) produces creative ideas
- (v) results in learning and change in and beyond the group
- (vi) creates social and political capital

- (vii) produces information that stakeholders understand and accept
- (viii) sets in motion a cascade of changes in attitudes, behaviours and actions, spin-off partnerships, and new practices or institutions
- (ix) results in institutions and practices that are flexible and networked, permitting the community to be more creatively responsive to change and conflict.

In addition to the above, Innes (2002); Healey (2006); Bickford (1996) claim, the facilitator for consensus-building having qualities such as (i) *listening and respect* that maintain one’s perspective as background while focusing on the emerging meaning the group is creating and (ii) *persuasion* in working collaboratively to develop one’s contribution and find the place for it in the total picture are also traits that are important to maintaining for “meaningful” consensus.

On the other hand, the scholarly writers who focus on structural or institutional traits that required for “meaningful” consensus claim, a strong correlation exists between the process criteria (institutional design) and the consensus-building (the outcome of communicative planning) (see Innes and Booher, 1999; Healey, 2006 for example). In this instance, the consensus-building discussion is much emphasised on its mode of governance at the institutional design for communicative planning. Healey (2006) in her works for collaborative planning recognises seven modes of governance for planning (**Table 4**): The scholars who employ these modes of governance to evaluate the consensus-building processes in planning often contrast them to traditional hierarchical governance modes and the new participatory modes of governance (See, for example, Healey, 2006; Newman, 2001 cited in Brownill, 2009). As opposed to traditional top-down administrative hierarchical modes such as *representative democracy, pluralist democracy, corporatism, clientelism, criteria-driven approach*, Healey recognised that *entrepreneurial consensus* and *inclusionary argumentation* modes of governance are seen as more responsive, driven by a collaborative relationship such as encouraging formal and informal alliances and horizontal network building of stakeholders and set a power shared context for communication, which would be most likely to achieve sustainable planning outcomes.

**Table 4:** Modes of governing the institutional design

<b>Governance type</b>	<b>Description</b>
Representative democracy	Governments are created on behalf of people and they are elected representatives of the public; the politicians. They oversee the work of officials in the government departments and the task of the politicians are guided by officials.
Pluralist democracy	A society composed of many different interest groups, all competing to define the agenda for the government actions.

	It produces politics of competing claims and groups are encouraged to articulate their concerns in adversarial forms.
Corporatism	This rejects the pluralist democracy assumption that all groups are relatively equal. It accepts governments may in effect be the creatures of a few powerful interests, e.g. it encourages “spatial alliances” or “growth coalitions” to develop urban regions. A good decision is the one that best achieves the public interest as defined by the corporate alliances.
Clientelism	Politicians and government officials involved in an interactive relationship through social networks. This mode of governance substitutes for the social network of family, friendship, fiefdom and business to allocate and distribute resources.
Criteria-driven approach	Public interests are justified through regulatory criteria and performance targets designed to encourage the efficient achievement of policy objectives. A good decision achieves agreed government objectives as efficiently and as accountable as possible.
Entrepreneurial consensus	Local alliances (partnership building activities) with development agendas and can be considered a form of local corporatism. The objective of consensus-building is horizontal network building. These tend to draw upon the knowledge of local business and political elites. The informal nature of such alliances contributes new ideas to the local arenas.
Inclusionary argumentation	This model seeks to pull the relation-building of local entrepreneurial alliances beyond these tendencies to corporatism. It develops a style that could realise the ideas of participatory discursive democracy practically. A good decision is taken in cognisance of the concerns of all members of a political community and that these members have the opportunity to express their views and to challenge the decisions made on their behalf, not just in the ballot box, but through rights and opportunities to challenge policies as they are developed and as they become guides for subsequent action.

Source: adapted from Healey (2006)

The other most important concerns about consensus-building were whether a particular consensus reached would be treated as a one-off process that has definitive ends. These reflect, for instance,

the critique on Communicative Planning Theory that lacks concern on an appeal process after the consensus-building (Chapter 1). The contemporary understanding of consensus building more explicitly recognises that the agreed strategy will always be under pressure when circumstances change, new stakeholders appear and new fractures appear among them (Healey, 2006). This indicates that the “strategy” or “built consensus” should be subject to continual reflexive critique and should alter over time as communities change and networks mature. Also, the decision or the strategy once finalised should also be allowed to appeal and challenge (an arbitration) if a stakeholder feels unfairly treated or if some feel the agreement is breaking (ibid). This, in a different angle, was echoed by Brownill (2009) and stated, when exploring how consensus-building applies for different notions of planning, it is important to highlight the dynamics between competing modes of governance. In connection to this, Innes and Booher (1999: 413) assert that consensus-building does have second and third-order effects years after the process is over. They can produce new relationships, new practices, and new ideas better than the current strategy (*Table 5*). Not only that but also their work claims that consensus building may be effective even if it has not accomplished its originally aimed targets as this is an evolving process. They view the most important element in this process is to help move a community toward higher levels of social and environmental performance, because its leadership has learned how to work together better and has developed viable, flexible, long-term strategies for action (ibid).

**Table 5** Potential outcomes of consensus building

<b>First-order effect</b>	<b>Second-order effect</b>	<b>Third-order effect</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social capital: trust, relationship</li> <li>• Intellectual capital: mutual understanding, shared problem frames, agreed-upon data</li> <li>• Political capital: the ability to work together for agreed ends</li> <li>• High-quality agreements</li> <li>• Innovative strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New partnerships</li> <li>• Coordination and joint action</li> <li>• Joint learning extends into the community</li> <li>• Implementation of agreements</li> <li>• Change in practices</li> <li>• Changes in perceptions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New collaborations</li> <li>• More coevolution, less destructive conflict</li> <li>• Results on the ground: adoption of cities, regions, resources, services</li> <li>• New institutions</li> <li>• New norms and heuristics</li> <li>• New discourses</li> </ul>

Source: Innes and Booher (1999)

# Chapter Seven

## The Contemporary Status Quo

Based on Habermasian communicative rationality, when planning becomes an action to form outcomes for the economy, society and environment, it should not only be considering the instrumental or scientific knowledge but also the emotive knowledge (generally of the public) that generate out of experiences of delivered planned outcomes. Therefore, in principle, achieving sustainable outcomes requires a communicative approach that promotes public participation. However, Habermas' normative mechanisms to implement such participation were subject to several critiques. Such critique labelled the Habermasian mechanism to participate as the “communicative ideal” which has not given due consideration to the real-world practical context of power relations of actors.

The Habermas' advocacy on power within communicative planning action –consensus-building should be undertaken in power neutral setting was central to the critiques aroused against his rationality for communication. His stance on power was seen as a lofty ideal of consensus-building free of constraints. The critiques argued that in the neo-liberalised setting, large corporations can exert their agency within the planning process in a way it could suppress the voices of the public. On the other hand, by broadening the participation from citizens to all stakeholders, the critiques argued that Habermas' rationality for communicative planning could become hypocrisy and tyranny on its own by supporting neo-liberalism rather than a mechanism to address its' market failures. Employing the Foucauldian perspective that power is everywhere and unavoidable, the later writers suggested, instead of trying to avoid, power within the communicative planning process it needs to be acknowledged. In this way, it opened up avenues to devise strategies to deal with it. Power need not always be seen with negativities but can also be utilized as a modality of change. The contemporary thinkers suggest the way to deal with power inequality among actors is empowering the less powerful actors (i.e power-sharing) such as the public to neutralise the power of large corporations. For this, power to authority, resources, discursive legitimacy and network power in which the actors could build through their mutual relationships and shared visions were advocated as the most appropriate strategies under the postmodern context.

Habermas framing the purpose of communicative planning as “build understanding and not the success through strategic action”, was also seen as differently by contemporary thinkers. The argument posited was, such actions of communicative planning will not produce authentic or true dialogue about stakeholder values, because the stakeholders will not come into the communicative process for altruistic reasons. The contemporary claim was that the stakeholders are often driven by their motivations to receive benefits or solve problems. In this way, communicative planning

can reach its roots that it is about dealing with reciprocity of values among actors and not to stereotype any opposing values of agents as NIMBYs etc. What needs to be revealed is how far this strategic intent of actors (in association with power relations) would influence the legitimacy of emotive knowledge generation for a particular planned outcome.

The sceptics on communicative rationality were also posited in terms of knowledge production and whether “meaningful” consensus building is possible via communicative planning. For example, there had been arguments, whether communicative planning what Habermas suggested would have the true ability to reach innovative solutions as consensus building or whether it would simply pick the common denominator produced by the powerful members in the process. These revisited Habermas’ scholarship and argued that communicative planning should explicitly acknowledge that the losers of the process to be allowed to challenge the decisions made and a particular consensus built should not be treated as a definitive end. In addition, the contemporary thinkers also acknowledge that “meaningful” consensus-building requires the (emotive) knowledge generated in the process to be validated (in terms of its use, level of concretion, commitment, relevance and truthfulness) before those being applied. Similarly, the later proponents of communicative planning suggested, in association with power relations, the principles in which the institutional design set up and the mode of governance in capturing the emotive knowledge for plan decision making are significant factors that determine the “meaningful” consensus building.

These theoretical communicative planning proponents have also brought the contemporary argument that communicative planning is a mechanism to achieve sustainable planning outcomes. In this process the challenges to communicative planning that stem from the “power” and “self-interest” of the agency are to be acknowledged and dealt with.

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